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AUTOMATED COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
ONLINE:  
FROM BLOCKING TO MONETIZATION OF 
USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan – University of Cambridge, 
King’s College1 
 
ABSTRACT 
Global platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Instagram or TikTok live 
on users ‘freely’ sharing content, in exchange for the data generated in the 
process. Many of these digital market actors nowadays employ automated 
copyright enforcement tools, allowing those who claim ownership to identify 
matching content uploaded by users. While most debates on state-sanctioned 
platform liability and automated private ordering by platforms has focused 
on the implications of user generated content being blocked, this paper places 
a spotlight on monetization. Using YouTube’s Content ID as principal 
example, I show how monetizing user content is by far the norm, and 
blocking the rare exception. This is not surprising, since both platforms and 
copyright owners significantly profit from monetization. However, 
contrasting complex automated enforcement tools such as Content ID against 
basic principles of copyright law, this paper shows how users loose out when 
their content is exploited. As aggravating factors, the paper points to far-
reaching powers that platforms as ‘functional sovereigns’ wield within their 
respective domains; and to the fundamentally distinct nature of norms set by 
these sovereigns. The platform’s application and enforcement of its own rules 
is hard-coded, immediate and automated: embedded in its infrastructure and 
code, implemented through automation, and adjudicated in its own courts, 
platform rules constitute brute facts, directly shaping our reality – hence 
transforming the nature of law as institutional (that is, socially constructed) 
facts. The paper concludes by critically reviewing mechanisms to protect 
users, including those set out in Article 17 of the EU’s Digital Single Market 
Directive. 
                                                 
1 Reader in International and European Intellectual Property Law, University of Cambridge 
– King’s College (Cambridge). I thank Graeme Dinwoodie and Oliver Englisch for their 
comments on earlier drafts, and Shivani Kabra for her excellent research assistance – all 
errors remain mine. 
 WORKING PAPER No. 51  
HENNING GROSSE RUSE-KAHN 
2
 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................ 1 
I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS AUTOMATED COPYRIGHT 
ENFORCEMENT ONLINE ............................................................................... 2 
II. INCENTIVES FOR MONETIZING USER GENERATED CONTENT ...... 5 
III. PLATFORMS AS FUNCTIONAL SOVEREIGNS ................................. 7 
IV. CONTRASTING YOUTUBE’S CONTENT ID AGAINST BASIC 
COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES .............................................................................. 9 
A. Eligibility ................................................................................ 9 
B. Subject Matter ...................................................................... 11 
C. Scope of Protection .............................................................. 12 
D. Defences and Dispute Settlement ......................................... 14 
E. No In-built Enforcement of ‘User Rights’ and the Public 
Domain 15 
V. PROTECTING USERS AGAINST DE-MONETIZATION ................... 16 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: TOWARDS AUTOMATED COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT 
ONLINE 
Technological change that affects society and/or our environment 
necessarily has an impact on law as one of the principal tools for regulating 
human interaction and our relations with the wider world. In that regard, 
technology has, over and over again, transformed human society and, by the 
need to respond to and accommodate new technologies, the laws made by 
man. Intellectual property (IP) law in particular is in constant transition 
through the dynamic development of technology. Changes in technology 
have always had a specifically profound effect on IP law because (1) the 
subject matter protected by IP is often technology-based or at least 
technology-related; (2) the production, dissemination, consumption and 
(commercial) exploitation of IP-protected subject matter is often based on 
technology; (3) and – as I want to argue here – nowadays, technology 
increasingly shapes the norm-setting, implementation and adjudication of IP 
law, at least in digital networks which are at the centre of this paper.  
The starting point for this argument concern well understood features of 
the digital network environment and their effects, in particular, on copyright 
law. First, the digital aspect: against the background of fairly low thresholds 
for copyright eligibility, and the fact that any access or use of content which 
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can be represented in electronic form in the digital environment necessarily 
involves copying (which in principle implicates exclusive rights), copyright 
is essentially always involved when digital content is used. Second, the 
network aspect: the internet as a decentralized, global network of inter-
connected electronic devices has exponentially amplified opportunities for 
citizens across the world to access, share and consume content. The 
decentralized nature of networks like the internet requires entities that 
mediate communications and other interactions between users – in other 
words: intermediaries. It is the use of automated content protection 
technologies by some of these intermediaries, namely platforms that bring 
together internet users in order to create, copy and share content online, that 
serves as the object of this analysis on how technology effectuates change in 
social and legal norms linked to IP.  
Digital market actors like Facebook, YouTube, Instagram or TikTok live 
on users ‘freely’ sharing content via their platforms in exchange for the data 
that users generate in the process (which can be sold on to others, including 
those running targeted adds on the platform that the targeted user then has to 
watch). The content users create and share is frequently based on, or at least 
involves elements of, appropriation of existing (copyright-protected) content. 
User creativity and ‘user-generated-content’ – for example in form of memes, 
mash-ups, play-alongs, or supercuts – tends to be expressed through re-
purposing, transforming or otherwise modifying or adding on existing 
content: a form of ‘remix culture’ that somewhat resembles sampling in 
nineteen-nineties’ Hip Hop.  
These types of remixes can become quite popular, occasionally bringing 
fame to their user-creators when shared widely on a platform. From a 
copyright perspective, some of that remixed content is likely to be infringing 
under applicable domestic laws – although much will still depend on the 
respective quantitative or qualitative thresholds for infringement and on any 
defenses or exceptions, such as fair use concepts or specific exceptions for 
the purpose of parody, pastiche, satire, quotation, news reporting, education, 
research, and so on.2 Hence, platforms that allow such content to be shared 
run the risk of meeting traditional accessory liability tests, or of otherwise 
being held liable for infringing acts of their users – unless of course they can 
rely on so called ‘safe harbors’ that exempt liability for intermediaries under 
certain conditions. While details differ and not all major jurisdictions offer 
specific safe harbors, these safeguards from liability converge around a 
‘notice and take-down’ model whereby intermediaries have to act 
expeditiously when they become (or should be) aware of infringing acts of 
their users (often via a notification).3 In order to avoid liability, platforms are 
                                                 
 
2 For a discussion from a US perspective, see M Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the 
Transformation of Copyright Law, Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 93 No.2 (2017), pp.518-
520. 
3 See e.g., Art.14 of the Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular 
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taking steps to respond to infringement notifications, by removing or 
blocking access to allegedly infringing content.4 
Increasingly, platforms however also rely on filtering systems and other 
automated content protection tools that check, usually in real-time, any 
content uploaded or otherwise shared by users against reference files in huge 
databases for content submitted by those claiming rights in that content.5 As 
the specific mechanisms and technical tools used by platforms such as 
Google, YouTube, Facebook or Instagram differ, this discussion focuses on 
one of the most sophisticated and arguably most profitable filtering systems: 
YouTube’s ‘Content ID’6. As discussed further below, once Content ID’s 
automated content recognition tool detects a match, the entity (or entities) 
claiming rights over that content is notified. That entity can then decide (case-
by-case or in form of setting general rules) over the further fate of the user 
content uploaded or shared. It can of course be blocked – but, given the 
popularity of user generated content which often gets thousands (and 
occasionally millions)7 of views, those claiming rights in that content may 
find it much more economically interesting to monetize the user content, for 
example by running ads against it. In other words, anyone able to rely on 
automated matching tools claiming can profit from user uploads that 
                                                 
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market  (hereafter E-Commerce Directive); 17 U.S.C. 
512(c) (2018) (US), introduced by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 1998. 
4 For an empirical account of the notice and take-down system in the US, see J Urban, J 
Karaganis & B Schofield, Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice UC Berkeley Public 
Law Research Paper No. 2755628. (March 22, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2755628; 
see also K Erickson & M Kretschmer “This Video is Unavailable” Analyzing Copyright 
Takedown of User-Generated Content on YouTube, JIPITEC 2018, 75-89.  For a discussion 
on the EU system see C Angelopoulos, European Intermediary Liability in Copyright: A Tort-
Based Analysis, Kluwer (Kluwer 2016) and M Husovec, Injunctions Against Intermediaries 
in the European Union: Accountable But Not Liable? (CUP 2017). 
5 A general description of automated enforcement tools by one of the major providers 
(Audible Magic) is at https://www.audiblemagic.com/compliance-service/#how-it-works. 
Specific content protection tools – other than the one by YouTube discussed in detail below 
– are for example discussed here (https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/instagram-block-
copyright-infringement-video-1202692290/ - regarding Instagram) and here 
(https://variety.com/2017/digital/news/facebook-rights-manager-copyright-videos-third-
party-1202578122/ - concerning Facebook). 
6 To understand the basics of Content ID – which as per YouTube’s owner Google 2018 
report now deals with 98% of all copyright issues on YouTube, see ‘How Google Fights 
Piracy’, 7 November 2018, p.21&25 at https://www.blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public-
policy/protecting-what-we-love-about-internet-our-efforts-stop-online-piracy/– have a look 
at the short (YouTube) video: https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en-
GB. For a legal analysis, see the authors discussed below and also S Jacques, K Garstka, M 
Hviid, J Street, Automated anti-piracy systems as copyright enforcement mechanism: a need 
to consider cultural diversity, European Intellectual Property Review (2018) 40(4), 218-229. 
7 See for example https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l4HpWQmEXrM&feature=youtu.be, 
a video of a surprise marriage proposal using an Indie-Pop song as background that, due to 
the video’s popularity, has been listened to by 14 million viewers. See also the ‘Harlem 
Shake’ example, discussed in Michael Soha and Zachary J. McDowell, Monetizing a Meme: 
YouTube, Content ID, and the Harlem Shake, Social Media + Society, January-March 2016, 
pp.1-12. 
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incorporate anything matching with the content they claim. This is not only 
the default and most relied on option on YouTube’s Content ID,8 but equally 
available on Facebook and Instagram;9 while TikTok does not offer 
automated copyright enforcement tools to right holders and instead tries to 
ensure all of its user generated content is fully licensed.10 
II. INCENTIVES FOR MONETIZING USER GENERATED CONTENT 
Given that safe harbors don’t require upload filters and actually can 
discourage proactive monitoring,11 why would platforms invest up to 100 
million USD12 in the development, maintenance and further improvement of 
these sophisticated content protection tools? It may in part be that they prefer 
to cooperate with content owners in order to avoid risky litigation,13 and to 
                                                 
8 YouTube for example explains that since January 2014, Content ID claims have 
‘outnumbered copyright takedowns by more than 50 to 1’ (see 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7002106?hl=en-GB). In 2017, 90% of Content 
ID claims imposed automated monetization by running adds against an upload which 
matches with claimed content – which  overall has resulted in YouTube paying out more than 
6 billion USD in total (and over 1.8 billion from 10/2017-09/2018) to right holders who have 
monetised the use of their content on the platform – see ‘How Google Fights Piracy’, as note 
5, p.23. 
9 On copyright owner’s options to earn from ads through Facebook’s and Instagram’s 
automated enforcement system, see 
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/2276498512619396 and generally 
https://www.facebook.com/help/publisher/1548693938521733.. 
10 TikTok, an increasingly popular App which in 2019 had been installed more than 738 
million times, allows users to upload short videos (usually between 15-60 seconds) which 
they can produce, using a range of tools offered by the App, including music, films and sound 
effects users can select from large databases of licensed content. While TikTok does not offer 
users a share in the revenue generated through adds, this popularity allows TikTok users to 
reach an ever-increasing audience where users with a large following (‘influencers’) can earn 
significant amounts via tips received during live streams or, more importantly, sponsor deals 
where they promote products to their fan base (see for example 
https://www.distractify.com/p/can-you-make-money-on-tik-tok). On TikTok’s potential 
liability for copyright infringement, see ‘TikTok App Navigating Copyright Laws’, 
Klemchuck LLP (20 12 2018), https://www.klemchuk.com/ip-law-trends/tiktok-app-
navigating-copyright-laws; and Divij Joshi, Is the Clock Ticking for TikTok’s Intermediary 
Liability Exemptions?, Spicy IP Blog, 2 September 2019 – online at 
https://spicyip.com/2019/09/is-the-clock-ticking-for-tiktoks-intermediary-liability-
exemptions.html 
11 Active monitoring may not only breach data protection or privacy rules and cannot be 
demanded from service providers under Art.15 of the E-Commerce Directive – it also may 
lead to liability for inaction once a platform becomes aware (or should have been aware on 
the basis of its monitoring) of infringing content. 
12 Based on Google’s own 2018 report, it has invested more than 100 million USD into 
building Content ID, the automated enforcement tool used by YouTube (which belongs to 
Google) – see ‘How Google Fights Piracy’, as note 5.  
13 The experience of operators like Napster or Grokster (see the US Supreme Court decision 
in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)) will have told platform 
operators that a full collision course with content owners is not helpful in guaranteeing the 
survival of their own business model. That can be better achieved by avoiding too much 
confrontation with right holders. 
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appear as trustworthy partner for content owners – or that they aim to 
anticipate legislative14 (or jurisprudential)15 change which requires them to 
be more proactive. As a result and in order to rather ‘err on the side of 
caution’, there is likely to be a tendency to over-enforce copyright claims.  
Most importantly however: employing content protection tools that allow to 
monetize user-generated content also creates quite a lucrative market for 
platforms, as they usually will be able to claim a (significant) share in the 
advertising revenue (or other form of monetization) generated by sharing the 
user’s content.16 In addition, large-scale availability of user content attracts 
more users and keeps existing users on the platform – generating even more 
revenues, including via shares in monetization activities by those claiming 
rights in user content.  
In other words: the remix culture of users is turned into a profit enterprise 
for platforms and content owners17 which collude to exploit the user’s ‘digital 
labour’18 involved in creating and sharing content. Since platforms generally 
ask all their users for a world-wide, royalty-free and transferable license to 
use any element of the content a user might own,19 one might say that from a 
technical-legal perspective, everyone should be happy. But apart from the 
colluded exploitation of user content and user data in which platforms and 
content owners engage (of which most users are most likely unaware), one 
might wonder about the type of copyright (or rather, “content protection”) 
norms that are imposed and automatically enforced through the platform.  
How does this form of private ordering align with our domestic copyright 
regimes, and the normativity embedded therein? In particular, is the 
widespread monetization of user generated content supported by copyright 
principles as we know them? One might think that exploiting user’s content 
through monetization has no legal basis if the use of content falls under a 
copyright exception, or is otherwise non-infringing. But even if user 
                                                 
14 See e.g. the approach adopted in Art.17 of the Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Digital Single Market and amending Directives 96/9/EC and 2001/29/EC, OJ (L 130) 92, 
May 17, 2019 (‘Digital Single Market’ or ‘DSM’ Directive), discussed in Section V below. 
15 See e.g., the ‘Pirate Bay’ judgment of the CJEU, Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV and XS4All 
Internet BV - Case C-610/15 (14 June 2017), extending primary liability for copyright 
infringement to certain hosting platforms. 
16 In the case of YouTube, that appears to be around 40-50% of the money generated through 
monetising content claimed by those eligible for Content ID, see Soha & McDowell, as note 
6 above.  
17 Consider the telling examples provided by Stephen Witt, When your YouTube video 
becomes a corporate profit center, Los Angeles Times, Jun 27, 2015 – online at 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0628-witt-youtube-copyright-20150628-
story.html;  as well as the ‘Harlem Shake’ meme discussed by Soha & McDowell, as note 6 
above.  
18 See the discussion in Soha & McDowell, as note 6 above, p.6. 
19 See e.g. the ‘Licence to YouTube’ and ‘Licence to Others’ conditions in YouTube’s Terms 
of Service – at https://www.youtube.com/static?gl=GB&template=terms (as updated on 22 
July 2019).  
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generated content does involve a bit of copyright infringing content (e.g. a 
one minute extract of a recorded song that serves as background in a 15 
minute video), it is not immediately clear that the user content as a whole (the 
whole 15 minute video that otherwise does not infringe) should be monetized 
exclusively by the platform and the copyright owner.20 From a restitutional 
perspective, one might rather suggest that allocating all revenues from 
monetization to the content ID claimant (or anyone else relying on automated 
enforcement tools) and hence de-monitising users and creators subject to such 
claims constitutes unjust enrichment. 
III. PLATFORMS AS FUNCTIONAL SOVEREIGNS 
In the remainder of this paper, I want to sketch a ‘brave new world’ of 
automated content protection based on the example of YouTube’s Content 
ID system – although this is just one (albeit a quite sophisticated and 
complex) case of a broader trend towards parallel legal universes that 
occasionally reflect state-made IP laws, but often diverge from them in 
significant ways. My focus is on the transition towards an increasingly 
comprehensive and transnational private ordering we are facing as globally 
operating online platforms set their own rules (or ‘community guidelines’), 
implement them through their codes and user interfaces, and enforce them 
through algorithms. In constitutional terms, platforms (partially in concert 
with those who claim rights in the content users upload or share) set norms, 
apply and enforce them, and also act as quasi-adjudicators over disputes. 
Confirmed by announcements such as Facebook declaring it will set up its 
own ‘supreme court’,21 platforms increasingly act like states within their 
operational domain – or, as it has been aptly put, as ‘functional sovereigns’.22 
However, it is not only about a concentration of legislative, executive and 
judicative power is in the hands of those which have an evident self interest 
in how this power is exercised. There is an additional, transnational 
dimension as most platforms operate across borders, and often on an 
                                                 
20 This however appears to be the current practice on YouTube – i.e. a tiny amount of 
copyrighted content if claimed under Content ID generally prevents the user to monetise 
her/his videos – regardless how irrelevant that copyrighted material is for the success of the 
user’s video as a whole – see the discussion in Section IV 3. below. 
21 According to its Charter 
(https://fbnewsroomus.files.wordpress.com/2019/09/oversight_board_charter.pdf), the 
‘court’ (which Facebook refers to as oversight board) is meant to be independent of 
Facebook’s executive branch (Article 5), able to bind the executive with its decisions 
(Articles 1 Section 4 & Article 4), and will base those decisions on Facebook’s ‘values’ which 
‘guide its content policies and decisions’ (Article 2 section 2), rather than local or otherwise 
applicable laws made by states (Article 7). See generally K Cox, Facebook plans launch of 
its own ‘Supreme Court’ for handling takedown appeals, 18 September 2019 - online at 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2019/09/facebook-plans-launch-of-its-own-supreme-
court-for-handling-takedown-appeals/ (with further links to the Charter of the court, and 
other founding documents by Facebook). 
22 I owe this term to John Naughton, making this observation during a discussion at Wolfson 
College, Cambridge, November 2019. 
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international scale. In contrast to states where sovereignty is primarily limited 
through territory, the functional sovereignty of online platforms frequently 
has global reach, and in any case transcends national borders. And perhaps 
most importantly, the efficacy of automated private ordering and its impact 
by prescribing how we experience audio-visual content easily surpasses 
international and national IP norm-setting. Even the most detailed rules in 
comprehensive IP chapters in free trade agreement (FTAs) require 
transposition into domestic IP laws and, crucially, enforcement ‘on the 
ground’ through domestic offices and courts. In the world of automated 
content protection tools however, everyone only gets to access, experience 
and use what passes through filters and other algorithmic gatekeepers, 
implementing the normative decisions they embed and execute.23 
In philosophical terms, the norms set and enforced in that way do not 
represent institutional facts (that is, facts dependent on human construction 
and agreement) anymore – they become brute (physical) facts.24 Or, in socio-
technological terms, norms set, enforced and adjudicated by functional 
sovereigns transcend Lessig’s conception of ‘code as code’: norms are not 
only embedded and enforced through technology – the physical ‘remoteness’ 
and global spread of platforms allows these actors to expand their autonomy 
in creating, implementing and adjudicating them without the need of state-
sanctioned infrastructures. These fundamental effects not only concern 
blocking of content, but also affect monetization. While the content remains 
available for the user and others to view and share, once it is ‘claimed’ only 
the claimant profits from it in economic terms. In light of the absence of 
effective complaint and dispute resolution tools discussed below, the norm 
so imposed is that users cannot commercially benefit from their content when 
claimed by others. In essence, users are deprived of any copyright in works 
they create and upload as soon as they include material matching with content 
that others claim. Section IV below offers further, more detailed examples of 
platform rules operating as brute facts with global reach. 
One may counter that the reach of platform normativity is at best inter-
partes and voluntary – and hence cannot be compared with the inter-omnes 
effects of binding legal rules, set out in domestic (IP) statutes and their 
                                                 
23 As Niva Elkin-Koren has aptly put this: ‘Algorithmic copyright enforcement (…) has 
changed copyright default: if copyrighted materials were once available unless proven to be 
infringing, today materials that are detected by algorithms are removed from public 
circulation unless explicitly authorized by the right holder.’ See N Elkin-Koren, Fair Use By 
Design, UCLA Law Review, Vol. 64 (2017), 1082, 1093. In addition, the norms and potential 
biases embedded in automated enforcement tools are likely to frame user experiences and 
gradually change user behavior. See generally D Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, U. Chi. L. Rev., 
Vol. 86 (2019) 283. 
24 On the philosophical distinction between institutional or social facts (which generally 
include socially constructed things such as money and legal norms) and brute (physical) 
facts, see the works of G.E.M. Anscombe and J Searle. On an application of this approach to 
IP law, see Alexander Peukert, Kritik der Ontologie des Immaterialgüterrechts, Mohr-
Siebeck (2018). 
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international treaty counterparts. Surely, no-one is forced to use a platform 
like YouTube, Facebook or Instagram – and we are also not compelled to do 
online searches via Google. As private individuals choosing to use the 
services offered to us by private market actors, we are in well-known domain 
of private party relations where (with some occasional limits) party autonomy 
and freedom of contract reign.  
However, even it can be shown that users have validly agreed to the rules 
of the platform,25 it appears doubtful that notions of party autonomy and 
freedom of contract were designed to serve as foundations for creating private 
content protection regimes with global reach, pared with immediate and 
automated enforcement. Furthermore, the argument that users are free not to 
use the platform neglects the fact that many of these platforms nowadays 
function as essential facilities in accessing and communicating content 
online.26 Their role as facilitating freedom of speech and information has 
been recognized by courts which take this function into account when 
determining platform liability, for example for direct and indirect copyright 
infringements.27 If platforms are privileged based on their public interest 
function, why should they not also have to be held responsible to actually 
fulfil this function? I will come back to this key issue of accountability and 
responsibility below – after setting out in some more detail how systems such 
as Content ID operate. 
IV. CONTRASTING YOUTUBE’S CONTENT ID AGAINST BASIC COPYRIGHT 
PRINCIPLES 
A. Eligibility  
First of all, Content ID is not for everyone. Without giving away any 
                                                 
25 The Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris for example held that a blanket for license to use 
all user generated content on Twitter, including future works, in Twitter’s general terms of 
service breaches various author protections rules of the French Copyright Code and hence is 
invalid – see Tribunal de Grande Instance, Décision du 07 août 2018, 1/4 social N° RG 
14/07300 - http://entreprises.claisse-associes.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/TGI-Paris-
7-ao%C3%BBt-2018-UFC-Twitter.pdf. Subsequent decisions have confirmed this for the 
terms of service for Google and Facebook; see Paris Tribunal (Tribunal de Grande Instance), 
UFC-Que Choisir v Google Inc (12 February 2019) and Paris Tribunal (Tribunal de Grande 
Instance), UFC-Que Choisir v Facebook Inc. (9 April 2019) – discussed by Mathilde Pavis 
on the IP Kat Blog at https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/03/paris-tribunal-strikes-again-and-
guts.html and https://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/05/things-come-in-threes-paris-
tribunal.html. 
26 See for example the discussion of the essential role of private platforms with regard to free 
speech: Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, And Processes Governing 
Online Speech, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 131:1598 (2018). For a competition law analysis 
(with a focus on big data), see I Graef, EU Competition Law, Data Protection and Online 
Platforms: Data as Essential Facility, Kluwer 2016. 
27 See CJEU judgments in Case C‑360/10, SABAM v Netlog (16 February 2012), para.48-50 
and Case C‑314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien v Constantin Film Verleih (27 March 2014), 
para.55-57; and in particular the decision of German Federal Supreme Court (BGH) in 
Vorschaubilder III (I ZR 11/16 – 21 September 2017), para.60-62. 
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specific thresholds, YouTube indicates that ‘to be approved, you must own 
exclusive rights to a substantial body of original material that is frequently 
uploaded by the YouTube user community.’28 The platform makes clear that 
it reserves to itself the final say on what enforcement tool it decides to provide 
to whom29 – pointing also to more basic (i.e. less automated and scalable) 
options such as its ‘Content Verification Programme’30, a ‘Copyright Match 
Tool’31 and a simple copyright notification web form.32 YouTube apparently 
tries to offer the right type of tool to copyright owners with different needs, 
mainly based on the amount of their content shared on YouTube. A more 
cynical view would point out that (copy)rights and effective protection is 
provided only to major players – not individual creators with a handful of 
self-made videos or a few songs that others include in their YouTube uploads.  
In any case, leaving it to the platform to decide who gets efficient and 
automated filters and who needs to engage in individual searches is quite 
problematic. The more these automated tools develop into the key 
mechanisms for enforcing copyright online, the more important is a non-
discriminatory approach to eligibility. The most powerful tools will offer the 
most favorable protection, while not being eligible may at some point in the 
future mean that there is no effective protection available. Of course, in the 
‘real’ world, a large-scale copyright owner will usually be better off than an 
individual author in terms of enforcing rights based on IP laws and through 
the judicial system – but at least the same rights and remedies are available 
to all. Offering differentially effective enforcement tools means to administer 
selective justice – in this case with no convincing reason for such a 
discriminatory approach. Such an approach is even more problematic where 
less powerful and economically weaker parties are likely the ones that are 
stuck with inefficient enforcement tools – while scalable and automated 
systems that invite to be abused (as shown below) are given in the hands of 
major copyright holders only. Even if smaller copyright owners have the 
option to sign up with a third-party service provider that administers Content 
ID for smaller players, that creates additional costs and will not usually be a 
                                                 
28 See ‘How Content ID Works’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370.  
29 See ‘Qualifying for Content ID’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/1311402.  
30 See ‘Content Verification Programme’ (CVP) – which YouTube describes as ‘designed 
especially for copyright-holding companies to issue multiple removal requests’ and hence 
equally not accessible for everyone, and again subject to an application to be accepted by 
YouTube; See https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6005923. A key difference to 
Content ID appears to be that CVP relies essentially on active searches by content owners, 
whereas Content ID filters any upload against content submitted to its reference databases, 
and conducts a legacy scan of all existing content on YouTube, searching for matches. 
31 The Copyright Match Tool (CMT) can be used to individually search for full re-uploads 
(rather than just partial matches) of one’s own videos on other YouTube channels, and 
operates on a ‘first to file’ basis where only (near to) full matches with subsequent video 
uploads can be claimed. As of t is currently only available as a pilot for a limited number of 
YouTube channels – see https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7648743. 
32 See generally ‘Copyright management tools’ - 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/9245819.  
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realistic option for an individual creator. 
 
B. Subject Matter  
Secondly, not all content is meant to be protected under Content ID.  But 
there is no mechanism to check whether the (presumably low) thresholds for 
copyright protection of the respective lex loci protectionis (or in fact those of 
any domestic law) are in fact met. Seemingly operating under the premise 
that all video and sound recordings – however short – are protected under 
neighboring rights and that any use not covered by an exception necessarily 
infringes,33 there is no attempt to check submitted content for subject matter- 
or threshold eligibility. Nor does Content ID verify whether the amount used 
in a claimed video would constitute infringement under the law of the country 
where protection is claimed. Instead, YouTube emphasizes that eligible 
Content ID users should only claim content for which they actually hold 
exclusive rights in the territories claimed.  Its webpages  explain, for example, 
that content licensed under a Creative Commons (CC) license, ‘public 
domain footage’ or material ‘used under fair use principles’ is ‘ineligible for 
use in or as a reference [file]’.34 But who is going to check that ineligible 
content is not claimed? 
While it warns not to abuse the system and threatens to act if it becomes 
aware of such abuse, YouTube eventually leaves it to the content claimant to 
ensure that no wrongful claiming occurs;35 and to resolve ownership and 
                                                 
33 A normatively flawed proposition in light of the original intent of such neighbouring rights 
to protect (significant) investment into activities that mediate and disseminate copyrighted 
works – but one which has been supported by the Opinion of the Advocate General to the 
CJEU in Moses Pelham GmbH vs Ralf Hütter (Case C‑476/17), 12 December 2018. The 
subsequent CJEU judgment of 29 July 2019, para.26-39 & 66-74, held that even the inclusion 
of very short samples (2 seconds in the case at hand) implicates the exclusive right of 
reproduction of the producer of the sound recording from which the sample has been taken 
– unless the sample has been modified to an extent that it is unrecognizable. If the sample 
does remain recognizable, its use may fall under the quotation defence if it is used in a way 
that it ‘enters into a dialogue’ with the work (here phonogram) quoted. One has to assume 
that the approach adopted for audio recordings will equally apply to video recordings (films), 
so that any use of short, recognisable snippets amounts to an infringement in the EU – unless 
it can be justified under an exception. In the US, the Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held 
a 37 second sample (used in a 7 minute song) to be fair use – primarily because of its 
transformative nature, the reasonable relation between amount and purpose of use, and since 
the use did not serve as market substitute for the original work; see  Estate of James Oscar 
Smith v. Cash Money Records, Inc., Summary Order, 3 February 2020. 
34 See ‘Content eligible for Content ID’ – online at: 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2605065.  
35 YouTube explains that as it automatically generates claims against those upload matching 
content, the Content ID user is ‘responsible for avoiding incorrect results’, such as ‘claims 
that interfere with authorised uses of content. It however also warns that ‘YouTube takes 
action to address cases of abuse and error’, including disabling specific reference files (…) 
and releasing all associated claims, disabling Content ID or even terminating YouTube 
partnership. See ‘Content Eligible for Content ID’ as note 32. 
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other disputes over any claims made.36 In its further explanations on eligible 
content, YouTube simply stresses that the reference content provided must 
be ‘sufficiently distinct’ (hence excluding remasters, soundbeds or 
production loops), and individualized (i.e. excluding compilations, DJ mixes 
or mash-ups).37 Anecdotal evidence of all kinds of false positives in claiming 
content not copyright-protected, not owned by the entity claiming it, or 
clearly within the ambit of copyright exceptions (in particular fair use) shows 
that leaving it to content owners to ‘self-regulate’ and simply warn them not 
to over-claim has, at least from a normative perspective, not worked well in 
the past.38 
 
C. Scope of Protection  
Third, the scope of protection and ‘remedies’ offered by the platform vis-
à-vis user uploads that match claimed content focus on common options 
(called ‘policies’39 in the case of Content ID) such as: 
(1) monetising (allowing the matching upload to be viewed and display 
advertisements with it); 
(2) tracking (merely collecting statistics about views); or  
(3) blocking (i.e. not allowing the matching upload to be viewed).40  
Content owners can distinguis between how their own content and 
matching uploads are treated,41 customise policies for individual countries,42 
or simply rely on YouTube’s default policy which is to monetise throughout 
the world.43 As this also pays out for the platform, the system is 
unsurprisingly geared towards monetization and towards the use of 
automated tools like Content ID more generally – which according to 
YouTube ‘has outnumbered copyright takedowns by more than 50 to 1’.44 To 
incentivise content owners to use this system, YouTube provides them with 
sophisticated tools to tailor algorithmic enforcement to their individual 
needs.45 Enforcement means that in principle any match with content claimed 
                                                 
36 See ‘How to avoid and resolve improper claims’ - 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/4352063 
37 See ‘Content eligible for Content ID’, as note 33. 
38 See M Sag, as note 1, at 544-554. 
39 For a comprehensive database on policies set for audio content on YouTube, see the ‘Music 
Policy Directory’ at https://www.youtube.com/music_policies. 
40 See ‘Policy and claims basics’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/107383.  
41 See ‘Usage policies and match policies’ - 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/107129. 
42 See ‘Create a custom policy’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/106964. 
43 See ‘Set default policies’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3369992. 
44 See ‘The difference between copyright takedowns and Content ID claims’ - 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/7002106. 
45 For example, to customise a policy in a way that it allows short uploads from fans (which 
of course may function as promotional tools, and facilitate goodwill – see 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/107129), or to ‘whitelist’ (i.e. exempt) certain 
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by an owner will trigger a Content ID claim,46 without a de minimis threshold 
for finding ‘infringement’.47 YouTube however does ask Content ID users 
not to ‘overclaim’ and to ‘clean up mistaken claims’.48 It also requires them 
to ‘[v]alidate potentially invalid reference content’ – suggesting that it 
employs further checks reviewing in particular whether content claimed is 
actually eligible for Content ID, including whether it incorporates public 
domain footage.49 The extent to which these checks occur, and whether they 
are based on automated or human review, nevertheless remains unclear. 
As the discussion in Section II has suggested, exploiting user uploads 
through monetization has no basis in copyright law if the use of content falls 
under a copyright exception, or is otherwise non-infringing. As also observed 
above, even if user generated content does involve a fraction of copyright 
infringing content, it is not immediately clear that the user content as a whole 
should be monetized exclusively by the platform and the copyright owner; 
hence per se excluding those who incorporate claimed material. This however 
appears to be the current practice on YouTube:  a tiny amount of copyrighted 
content if claimed under Content ID generally prevents the user to monetise 
her/his videos – regardless how irrelevant that copyrighted material is for the 
success of the user’s video as a whole.50 In sum then, any upload claimed as 
allegedly infringing by Content ID can only be monetized by the entity 
making the Content ID claim, preventing users faced with such a claim from 
earning any shares in the revenues generated from ads run against their works 
on YouTube.51 
                                                 
channels run by partners or promoters from Content ID claims (see 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6070344). Since an uploaded video may well be 
caught by multiple claims, including from different content owners, YouTube also offers 
mechanisms for prioritising the more ‘restrictive’ policies (i.e. blocking prevails over 
tracking – see https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6300781), to resolve ‘asset 
ownership conflicts’ and to distribute shares in monetisation (see 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3013321). 
46 See ‘Choose effective references’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3013321. 
47 While YouTube does seem to set a minimum length for matches at around 30 seconds, that 
can be manually set at a lower threshold by those eligible for Content ID.  
48 See ‘Clean up incorrect claims’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/4352063. 
For example, one has to exclude content one does not own from a reference file submitted 
for identifying matching uploads (https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/4389910).  
49 See https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/6013183. 
50 See ‘What kind of content can I monetise?’ 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2490020?hl=en-GB and the blog discussion at 
https://support.google.com/youtube/thread/1281991 where YouTube admits that it is ‘clearly 
not ideal’ that a copyright owner is ‘getting all of the creator’s revenue for a few seconds of 
a video’. An exception exists for certain eligible cover videos – see 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3301938. 
51 See the discussion here: https://support.google.com/youtube/thread/1281991 and here: 
https://youtube-creators.googleblog.com/2019/08/updates-to-manual-claiming-
policies.html (indicating that despite some changes to improve the system for creators, any 
inclusion of someone else’s content will continue to afford the exclusive monetization 
options to the Content ID claimant). 
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D. Defences and Dispute Settlement 
Fourth, while platforms generally offer mechanisms for users to dispute 
a claim by a content owner, dispute resolution is often without any 
involvement of independent third parties. From the outset, the onus is on the 
user whose uploaded content has been automatically blocked. YouTube, for 
example, explains to its users how to dispute a Content ID claim, in particular 
if they can argue for ‘fair use’ and/or their content being in ‘the public 
domain’.52 An interesting side-note is that YouTube appears to apply the US 
concept of fair use throughout its platform53 – rather than distinguishing 
based on the applicable exceptions and other limits in the country for which 
Content ID protection is sought. If it was to serve as a meaningful defense on 
the platform (akin to how sec.106 USCA has been applied by US Courts), 
this arguably would lead to a more effective ‘globalisation’ of fair use than 
any of the advocates for rolling the concept out internationally could have 
hoped for. The problem, however, is that on Content ID, users can’t rely on 
fair use (or any other defenses) effectively. If the user disputes a claim, it is 
then entirely up to the content owner whether it ‘releases’ or ‘upholds’ the 
claim. In the latter case, the user normally will have a right to appeal – which 
is in principle no more than another plea to the content owner to reconsider 
its claim over the upload.54  
An appeal to the content owner however does require the latter to request 
a copyright takedown, based (again regardless of the country for which 
protection is claimed) on the DMCA, if it wishes continue to uphold its 
claim.55 That in turn not only leads to a copyright strike (by YouTube) for 
the user,56 but also sets the DMCA machinery in motion. Again, it is 
interesting to note that Content ID indirectly globalises the notice and 
counter-notification system under the DMCA (a specific piece of US 
legislation), regardless of where the user resides. The user then has to submit 
a counter-notification under sec.512(g) DMCA if (s)he insists on the content 
to be released.57 In order to keep the disputed content offline, under 
                                                 
52 See ‘Dispute a Content ID claim’ - https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797454. 
In a November 2018 report, YouTube indicates that less than 1% of all Content ID claims 
are disputed – see ‘How Google fights Piracy, as note 5, at p.28. 
53 See for example the YouTube page targeting a German audience and explaining fair use: 
‘Was ist “Fair Use” (angemessene Verwendung)’ -  
https://www.youtube.com/yt/about/copyright/fair-use/#yt-copyright-protection.  
54 See ‘Dispute a Content ID claim’, as note 51. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 For the user, receiving just one ‘copyright strike’ serves as a warning and affects the user’s 
ability to monetise her/his own content. A user that has received three strikes will have her/his 
account terminated, all uploaded videos removed, and will not be able to create new channels 
on YouTube – see https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2814000. Users therefore put 
their YouTube presence on the line if they appeal, and then have to issue a counter-
notification (thereby risking a lawsuit in the US, see below) in order to counter the strike. 
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sec.512(g)(2)(C) DMCA, the content owner would in principle have to 
initiate court proceedings against the user. But ‘to save time for right holders’, 
YouTube conducts an initial screening whether counter-notices ‘provide a 
sound rationale for reinstatement’.58 For a significant majority of counter-
notices, which apparently fail this test,59 the disputed claim will be finally 
resolved in favour of the content owner – without the user ever having been 
given the opportunity for independent, let alone judicial, review. 
One might argue that at least for those cases which have passed 
YouTube’s initial screening, eventually the matter will be decided by judicial 
authorities and that the onus is on content owners to initiate such proceedings. 
This probably is true for US-based users (assuming that they are willing to 
submit a counter-notification and later risk a lawsuit)60 – but will not work as 
well or as easily for users outside the US, who apparently are still subject to 
the DMCA-based process if they wish to retain their uploads on YouTube.61 
Under Section 512(g)(3)(D) of the US Copyright Act, the contents of any 
counter-notification must include a statement whereby the user consents to 
the jurisdiction of US Federal District Court of her/his permanent residence; 
or – if the user’s address is outside the US – to the jurisdiction of ‘any judicial 
district in which the service provider may be found’.62 In the case of 
YouTube, this arguably entails consent to be sued in California, where 
YouTube has its headquarters. Submitting a counter-notification hence 
means for a user from outside the US that (s)he consents to the jurisdiction 
of a US court, and arguably risks being sued as well as receiving a default 
judgment. It is apparent that this will prevent most non-US based users from 
filing counter-notices – which are necessary to overcome the content owner’s 
rejection of an appeal against any Content ID claim. The fact that YouTube 
occasionally will support fair use litigation in favor of users63 does little to 
correct the bias inherent in the Content ID system, which runs on simply 
accepting a content owner’s claim. 
 
E. No In-built Enforcement of ‘User Rights’ and the Public Domain 
In summary then, YouTube is affording content owners a powerful 
automated and scalable tool to act against any upload which matches with 
content they claim to own. As a private market actor who benefits 
significantly from monetization of its user’s content, YouTube has strong 
                                                 
58 See ‘How Google Fights Piracy’, as note 5, at p.31.  
59 YouTube rejects more than 2/3 of counter-notifications at this level, see ibid. 
60 Empirical evidence however suggests that counter-notifications are ‘a dead letter – 
impractical and rarely used’ – see Urban et al., as note 3 (2016), at 44. 
61 See ‘Counter Notification Basics’ at https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2807684.  
62 See Section 512(g)(3)(D) DMCA – whereby the user will also ‘accept service of process 
from the person who provided notification under subsection (c)(1)(C) [of the DMCA] or an 
agent of such person.’ 
63 See ‘How Google fights Piracy’, as note 5, p.32 and  ‘YouTube’s Fair Use Protection’ - 
https://www.youtube.com/intl/en-GB/yt/about/copyright/fair-use/#yt-copyright-protection. 
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economic interest in its Content ID system being widely used – and little 
incentive to ensure that the system reflects the traditional limits of copyright 
protection in terms of subject matter, thresholds for protection and 
infringement, and exceptions. It is then not surprising that YouTube leaves it 
essentially to content owners to stick to the limits of copyright law when 
operationalizing Content ID against its users. Whether or not these limits are 
actually adhered to, enforcement of content owner’s policies is automatic and 
built into the platform. This usually means that a user has to take legal action 
arguing that, under the applicable national law, for example: (1) the claimed 
content is not copyright protected; (2) the amount utilized does not amount 
to an infringement; or (3) an exception or other defense applies. So, the 
burden is on users to take matters into their hands to enforce their ‘rights’ or 
other mandatory copyright rules that work in their favor.  
The problem of course is that by and large, copyright laws do not 
conceptualize the various limits to copyright protection as ‘user’s rights’, and 
they are not necessarily contract- (or TPM) proof either.64 Arguably, in the 
world prior to automated enforcement, there was no need for this since the 
user would normally65 just use content and then copyright owners need to 
take action to enforce their rights. Automated content protection through the 
platform turns this on its head – which requires us to rethink ways to properly 
conceptualize limits to copyright in this context. In an environment where 
those who assert ownership over content determine what is protected and the 
platform defines how, and where these determinations are directly enforced 
through algorithms, society may wish to consider new and effective tools that 
re-enforce the public domain and other basic parameters within copyright 
law. 
V. PROTECTING USERS AGAINST DE-MONETIZATION 
Coming back to the theme of platforms as functional sovereigns and 
automated content protection, the tools to reinforce the basic parameters of 
copyright discussed above would ideally be directly built into the 
infrastructure and automated tools that platforms employ – ‘fair use by 
design’, as Niva Elkin Koren has called it.66 Others however, such as Dan 
                                                 
64 There are, of course, exceptions: on a proactive approach to copyright exceptions as user’s 
rights, see the Canadian Supreme Court judgment in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of 
Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, 2004 SCC 13. Mandatory exceptions which cannot be 
overridden by contract can be found in sec.29, 29A, 30, 30A&32 of the UK CDPA and in for 
example the EU Software and Database Directives. As discussed below, also Art.17(7) of the 
Digital Single Market Directive aims to ensure the applicability of certain exceptions in the 
context of content removal and blocking online. For a general discussion on user rights, see 
Pascale Chapdelaine, Copyright User Rights, Oxford University Press, 2017 as well as 
Graham Greenleaf and David Lindsay, Public Rights: Copyright’s Public Domains, 
Cambridge University Press, 2018. 
65 With the exception of situations where technological protection mechanisms (TPMs) are 
deployed.  
66 N Elkin-Koren, as note 22, at 1193.  
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Burk, have been rather critical of that approach, warning that ‘the design 
values embedded in algorithms will inevitably become embedded in public 
behavior and consciousness’, so that ‘algorithmic fair use’ exports and 
disseminates programmer’s (un)conscious biases or predisposed (training) 
datasets to all users, thereby ‘progressively altering the fair use standard it 
attempts to embody’.67  
Without addressing these concerns, Art.17(7) of the Digital Single 
Market Directive requires EU Member States to ensure that non-infringing 
user content remains ‘available’ on the platform. In particular, users must ‘be 
able to rely on’ the quotation, criticism and review, as well as the caricature, 
parody and pastiche exception.68 While a lot will depend how exactly EU 
Members implement Art.17(7) DSM, it seems to focus on preventing that 
non-infringing content is blocked or removed. That alone however is not 
enough. As the Content ID example shows, nowadays blocking or removing 
content is the rare exception and monetization the rule. EU Members should 
consider this when implementing the DSM. Since the ability to rely on the 
listed copyright exceptions arguably implies an option to invoke them also 
against attempts to monetize user content that amounts to a parody, quotation, 
criticism or review, one would hope that Art.17:7 will be implemented to 
cover monetization.   
It has also been argued that (at least by US standards, under sec.512(f)) 
after Universal vs Lenz,69 ‘consideration of fair use requires human review’ 
– even if the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly say so.70 Outside the notice and 
takedown system, US law however does not impose such requirement on 
privately ordered content protection tools.71 Art.17(9) DSM on the other hand 
does require in such cases that ‘decisions to disable access to or remove 
uploaded content shall be subject to human review’ – but could be read 
narrowly not to apply disputes over monetization. Extrapolating from the 
debates about incorporating fair use into machine-learning, a key question 
will be whether future automated copyright tools can be trained to understand 
and apply the boundaries and limits of our copyright laws, or at least the core 
normative principles? What machine-comprehendible proxies can we feed 
these tools to recognise works of authorship, originality, to distinguish 
between idea and expression, to apply other thresholds for infringements 
                                                 
67 See D Burk, as note 22, p.2, 9-17, see also the examples in M Sag, as note 1, at 562-563. 
68 In full, Art.17(7) states: ‘The cooperation between online content-sharing service providers 
and rightholders shall not result in the prevention of the availability of works or other subject 
matter uploaded by users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, including where 
such works or other subject matter are covered by an exception or limitation. Member States 
shall ensure that users in each Member State are able to rely on any of the following existing 
exceptions or limitations when uploading and making available content generated by users 
on online content-sharing services: (a) quotation, criticism, review; (b) use for the purpose 
of caricature, parody or pastiche.’ (emphasis added). 
69 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2016). 
70 M Sag, as note 1, p.533.  
71 Ibid, at p.544. 
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(such as a substantiality test), or to filter out other non-infringing uses, for 
example based on the more specific, enumerated exceptions in Europe? 
Without digging deep into the literature on machine-learning here,72 one 
will have little difficulty imagining that the outcomes of such an exercise are 
very likely to change our copyright norms, perhaps modifying the underlying 
value-judgments and eventually how copyright protection is socially 
constructed and experienced along the way. Counter-norms designed to 
implement these exceptions and other limits to (or constraints within) 
copyright via code, technical infrastructure and online complaint mechanisms 
are not just institutional (that is, constructed) facts – they are brute facts, 
directly shaping our reality. While we usually employ layers of discretion 
(appropriately exercised by enforcement agencies and judges) between a 
legal rule and its enforcement, hard-coded, in-built and automated rules are 
always enforced in full, on all occasions. That also means that checks and 
balances usually available to act against a perceived unfair or otherwise 
‘unjust’ enforcement need to be transposed into technology and 
infrastructure. This is a momentous task, and it is not clear how that can be 
achieved. But it is clear that this should not be left to private orders set by 
functional sovereigns like online platforms: even assuming the best of 
intentions to cater for all their customers and uphold ‘community values’ 
such as freedom of expression, private actors remain primarily committed to 
furthering their own interests, in particular profit maximisation.73  
The key then is not whether copyright by design is possible (it’s already 
here), or whether it will change copyright protection (it will), but what kind 
of change we – as an individual society or even ‘global community’ – 
consider desirable, or at least acceptable. That in turn essentially depends on 
who designs automated copyright protection, and whether there is oversight 
and accountability within that process. The example of YouTube’s Content 
ID perhaps primarily shows an overall drive away from blocking towards 
monetization of user content as default embedded in and facilitated by the 
system. At best, monetization can be seen as automated licensing of the 
copyrighted material users integrate into their videos and other created 
content. In that way, monetizing appears more user-friendly than large-scale 
take-downs when it comes to user content that infringes. But remember that 
no-one actually checks whether the content claimed is actually copyrighted, 
and whether its use is actually infringing. Unless a valid licensing agreement 
exists, such monetization of user-generated content arguably amounts to 
copyright infringement by the platform – as the user’s content will almost 
always contain a recording which qualifies for protection under neighbouring 
rights. Questions about the validity of the licensing aspects in the terms of 
                                                 
72 Instead, see the extensive discussion in D Burk, as note 22. 
73 For an illustrative example that shows the impact (and unintended consequences) of 
changes made by platforms to maximise the amount of time users spent on a platform see 
Kevin Roose, The Making of a YouTube Radical, New York Times 8 June 2019 – online at 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/08/technology/youtube-radical.html. 
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service agreements aside, excluding the user from any revenues generated 
through monetizing seems grossly unfair and exploitive. Even where user 
generated content involves copyright infringing material, that may well have 
minor significance for the popularity of that content, and in any case will 
usually not be the sole element that drives monetization. Exploiting the users 
‘digital labour’74 without compensation in this way effectively allows the 
platform and content owners to cash in on any original or public domain 
elements of the content uploaded by the user. Such outcomes should not be 
surprising when system design is by private market actors primarily driven 
by profit motives.  
If we think it is important that automated systems also reflect other 
interests, the stakeholders representing them must have a say and hence get 
to participate in the ‘quasi-legislative’ process of system design. Of course, 
this brings us back to the initial question of the role of intermediaries. Do we 
consider platforms like YouTube and others as private parties, as public 
utilities, as essential facilities, human right duty bearers or facilitators (or 
even guarantors) of freedom of expression online? If they are essentially 
private entities, then party autonomy, freedom of choice and contract should 
govern the extent to which users get to influence automated content 
protection tools – perhaps with a bit of mandatory contract law protections in 
favour of the weaker party.75 Taking account of the transnational (often 
global) and (close to) inter omnes effects of norm-setting by platforms 
described above, one may be inclined to categorise them in a way which takes 
these effects and their functions into account as well. These (and other) 
perspectives will determine follow-on questions of accountability and legal 
responsibility of platforms.76  
In my view, a more proactive approach is in principle justified by the 
effects and functions described above. Legislation should require automated 
content protection to be more transparent and comprehensible, for example 
by demanding that a machine-generated outcome is accompanied by 
explanations showing to those affected in an easy-to-understand way that 
(and how) copyright eligibility, infringing use, and exceptions and limitations 
have been considered.77 Platform regulation could also adopt a more rigid 
                                                 
74 See the discussion in Soha & McDowell, as note 6, p.6. 
75 This can be in form of mandatory (contract-proof) exceptions as for example in sec.29 
(4B), 29A(5), 30(1ZA), 30A(2) CDPA. 
76 See also Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright 
Enforcement, 19 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 473, 481 (2016). 
77 This could be linked to a good faith belief requirement that the claimed user content is 
actually infringing – akin to the approach in the Lenz judgment (note 68) – which should 
offer, as a minimum, an explanation to the user why her/his upload is claimed to be 
infringing, and what can be done to challenge this effectively in front of an impartial and 
independent third party, such as an ombudsman for platform users. In terms of additional 
transparency and fairness for (business) users of platforms, see also the Regulation (EU) 
2019/1150 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on promoting 
fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services – which, as per 
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standard whereby the platform and those who use its tools to enforce their 
copyrights show that they have undertaken a due diligence analysis of 
whether the use of their content as claimed actually amounts to an 
infringement, under the law of the country where protection is claimed.78 The 
platform as principal designer of the system could also be asked to show what 
exactly it does to prevent abuse (or more specifically, avoid protection 
beyond the core normative limits of applicable copyright laws) by those 
claiming rights in user content. Perhaps most importantly, we should search 
for more effective and fair remedies. Users must be able to contest these 
matters in meaningful dispute settlement proceedings offered by the platform 
which (1) must involve an independent and impartial review – for example 
by an ombudsperson for platform users; and (2) allow users to challenge 
claims – importantly also those involving monetization – in front of courts 
with jurisdiction over the protection claimed by a content owner.  
In case a user contests a claim, the onus should be on content owner to 
show a prima facie case of copyright or neighbouring right infringement –  
away from the current default where the ‘process accepts the rightsholder’s 
claim of infringement as correct until proven otherwise’.79 If automated 
enforcement allows allegedly infringing use to be stopped just on the basis of 
a claim, the decision to automatically enforce must be taken with care, and 
be reasoned and comprehensible to users – which for the time being might 
well mean that there needs to be a ‘human in the loop’. Art.17(9) DSM 
addresses some of these demands,80 but focuses on blocking and removing 
content – hence to a large extent disregarding exploitation of user content 
through monetization.81 Finally, akin to a duty to indemnify for damages 
suffered because of a request for preliminary (injunctive) relief or related 
court orders, one might even consider strict liability of those who decide to 
automatically enforce, should a court or other independent third party later 
find that no infringement existed. Overall, the idea is to adopt measures that 
account for, and re-balance, the fundamental shift which is inherent in 
                                                 
Art.2(1), however does not apply to consumers and other non-commercial end users. 
78 Discussions (ongoing, at the time of writing) in the UK about a ‘duty of care’ for platforms 
to take steps to prevent certain harms go in this direction. 
79 M Sag, as note 1, p.555. 
80 While a full discussion of Art.17(9) is not possible here, this provision calls for a ‘effective 
and expeditious complaint and redress mechanism’ available to users in cases of disputes 
over ‘disabling access to, or removal of’ their content. It asks right holders to ‘duly justify 
the reasons’ for their blocking and/or removal requests, and demands that ‘decisions to 
disable access or to remove uploaded content shall be subject to human review’.   
81 In its last sentence, Art.17(9) however does impose an obligation on EU Members to 
‘ensure that users have access to a court or another relevant judicial authority to assert the 
use of an exception or limitation to copyright and related rights.’ (Emphasis added). Assertion 
of an exception in this sense would arguably cover cases where the user complains about 
being subjected to monetization of her/his content that benefits from a copyright exception. 
One hopes that EU Members will implement this provision in such a way that not only 
disputes over blocking or removing content where users invoke copyright exceptions must 
end up in front of courts – but also those about monetization of content that falls under 
copyright exceptions. 
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algorithmic enforcement where our ability to experience content online is 
pre-determined by what automation allows us to see and hear. 
